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Book Reviews
A Lawyer When Needed. By Elliott Evans Cheatham.
Columbia University Press: New York and London, 1963.
Pp. xi, 128. $4.50.
In recent years, the increasing range and complexity
of our legal order have multiplied the need for legal services. Every instance where such a need, recognized or
not, is unmet, or is less than competently met, is a failure
of the legal profession. Some measure of such failure is
inevitable, but, on the whole, the legal profession must
justify itself by doing a reasonably good job of supplying
competent legal services when and where needed.
This highly polished and delightfully literate little book,
comprising the 1963 Carpentier Lectures delivered by Professor Cheatham at Columbia University, is a welcome
general survey of the major problems in the way of providing competent legal services to all in need of them.
After a general introduction, five situations are considered
in which "renewed efforts are needed to meet the need for
counsel"; they involve the hated, the poor, the middle
classes, specialized legal services, and the protection of the
public interest under our adversary system.
The record of achievement of bar and bench in providing competent representation for the unpopular defendant generally has been a proud one. Much progress
has been made in educating the public to the understanding
that any accused, however unpopular, is entitled to a zealous defense, and in countering the tendency to hate the
lawyer merely because he represents an unpopular client.
The courts have assigned able counsel'; they have permitted the volunteering of needed legal assistance, which
might otherwise have been difficult to obtain; they have
reversed convictions obtained by appeals to passion and
prejudice 3, and they have given counsel for the unpopular
I See, e.g., the defense of Anthony Cramer by Judge Medina on the charge
of treason (Cramer v. U.S., 325 U.S. 1 (1945)). Compare the successful and back-breaking - defense 'by appointed counsel in the District of Maryland. U.S. v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183 (1955).
2 See In Re Ades, 6 F. Supp. 467 (D. Md. 1934) ; N.A.A.C.P. v. Patty, 159
F. Supp. 503, 532 (E.D. Va. 1958). The Supreme Court has recently held
that statutory restrictions on solicitation of business by the bar conflicts
with the constitutional rights of the N.A.A.C.P. to use litigation as a means
of achieving social and political objectives. N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371
U.S. 415 (1963).
8 See, e.g., Viereck v. U.S., 318 U.S. 236 (1943).
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defendant particular leeway to encourage zealous and
fearless representation. However, continued effort and
vigilance are necessary, particularly in cases involving
racial discrimination or national security.
As to the poor, Professor Cheatham evaluates the various methods of legal aid: voluntary services of individual
lawyers; private legal aid organizations, including autonomous corporations, law school clinics, bar association or
social agency programs; the assigned counsel system; the
public defender system; the armed services program for
legal services to military personnel; and the provision of
legal assistance by certain types of administrative agencies.
The discussion includes an instructive review of the English system under which legal aid is subsidized by the
state but administered, without governmental interference,
by the Law Society." Surprisingly, Professor Cheatham
does not mention the contingent fee, which appears to
merit treatment in this survey. The Supreme Court decision in Gideon v. Wainwright,6 handed down after these
lectures, requires that the need of the indigent for counsel
be met in criminal prosecutions, and steps are being taken
to comply.,
The middle classes represent the most significant failure in the distribution of legal services. They are the
largest reservoir of unmet demand, but the canons of
ethics have made it difficult to meet their legitimate needs.
The result has been the growth of unauthorized lay pracI Compare Sacher v. U.S., 343 U.S. 1 (1952) with Sacher v. Association

of the Bar of the City of New York, 347 U.S. 388 (1954) and In Re Isserman,
345 U.S. 286 (1953).
5 The great success of the English system is due in large part to the
effective publicity which the program has received. The operation of the
system is thus summarized by Matthews, Lawyer Referral, the English
Equivalent, THE LAWYER REFaERRA BuLL nN, A.B.A. COMmiTTEE oN LAWYER
REFERRAL SERviCE, Nos. 1, 2-3 (1963) (quoted by Professor Cheatham) :
"Whether or not to take part in the Schemes is a matter for each lawyer those who are willing to do so have their names entered on panels which
are printed and made available to the public. Practically every firm of
solicitors and virtually all barristers in the country have joined panels....
The majority of the population are within the financial limits for Legal
Aid and well over half of all cases in the Courts are conducted under the
Scheme. Half of all those assisted have a sufficient income to pay a contribution, the average amount being about £50 - between a half and a
third of the total fee received by the solicitor and barrister."
0372 U.S. 335 (1963), noted 23 MD. L. REV. 332 (1963).
7 The Supreme Court decision has also created a host of additional problems. See, e.g., Proceedings of the New England Defenders Conference,
47 J. Am. JuDic. Soc. 159-98 (1964) and the discussion of the Criminal
Justice Bill of 1963 in Kennedy, The Department of Justice and the
Indigent Accused, 47 Am. JuDic. Soc. 182 (1964). See also Sachs, Book
Review, 23 MD. L. REv. 378 (1963). For a survey and earlier statutory
proposals, see Note, The Representation of Indigent Criminal Delendants
in the FederalDistrict Courts, 76 Hanv. L. REV. 579 (1963).
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tice of law and the growth of forms of practice by lawyers,
which, like bootlegging, are deplored but not so suppressed
as to deny the parched public.
We must make it possible for the bar to serve faithfully the large number, able to pay, who have no personal
contact with lawyers, and no understanding of how lawyers can help them, or of the cost of legal services. The bar
has responded with a public relations program of institutional advertising (which has been remarkably ineffective,
particularly in comparison with the English program) and
with the lawyer referral plan. A vast area is still untouched. Professor Cheatham suggests experimenting with
non-profit legal service offices maintained under bar auspices and law school facilities, and group practice under
appropriate standards and supervision, where services are
performed by lawyers procured for the client by an organization of which the client is a member. Professor Cheatham urges that the primary duty of the legal profession is
to serve the public and the limiting strictures of professional ethics should not leave legitimate needs unmet but
"should be accessory to the bar's affirmative role." A very
recent decision of the Supreme Court, holding a type of
group practice entitled to First Amendment protection, may
be a major step in unblocking creative action along these
lines.'
The chapter on specialized legal services is a valuable
introduction to a serious problem. The "giants" who took
all the law for their province are fast disappearing, the
solo practitioners are declining, and the cream of legal
practice is being funneled to specialized offices or to larger
firms where lawyers pool their special skills to render
"total client service".
Professor Cheatham seems unduly complacent about
the prospects for a continuing supply of a sufficient number of competent "generalists" - lawyers who can see a
situation whole, and (where necessary with the help of
specialists) negotiate a deal, try a case and steer a course.
The solo practitioner and the small firm do not necessarily
develop the broad skills of effective representation. In
far too many instances, legal problems in such offices are
unseen or dimly understood. A specialist, whose services
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State
U.S ... , 32 U.S. LAW WEEK 4374 (1964), holding unconstitutional
a Virginia anti-solicitation statute as applied to the Brotherhood's "Legal
Aid 'Plan" whereby the Brotherhood arranged to refer its members to
selected lawyers in accident cases. An earlier form of the plan had been
held, in Hildebrand v. State Bar, 36 Cal. 2d 504, 225 P. 2d 508 (1950), to
violate the rules of professional conduct of the State Bar of California.

Bar, ...
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would be most helpful, is often not called in because the
general practitioner is afraid of client-stealing. The existing continuing legal education program and the establishment of the A.B.A. section on general practice are at best
a small start on a large problem.
There has been an encouraging effort on the part of
the larger firms to encourage the development of generalists, or, at least, less narrow specialists, who do not panic
at the thought of trying a case or become tongue-tied
before an appellate court. The steps taken include rotation of associates so as to provide an internship in a broad
range of practice, and encouraging a period of service with
the Attorney General, the U.S. Attorney, legal aid, or an
office with similar opportunities for variety of assignments
and court appearances. The recently instituted Georgetown University Law School fellowships under which a
group of young graduate practicing lawyers conduct a substantial number of court cases under supervision could
profitably be copied in other law schools, and could be of
substantial help in meeting the expanded demand for
representation in criminal cases.
Professor Cheatham gives major attention in his discussion of specialization to what the organized bar needs
to do to coordinate "the three parties to the professional
triangle: the client, the generalist, and the specialist". If
specialization is to be fruitfully developed, and the small
general practitioner not extinguished, the general practitioner must be able to recommend consultation without
losing face, or his client; the client must be protected
against excessive fees; areas of specialization and standards of proficiency must be established; the identity of
qualified specialists must be made known, at least to the
bar, and the dangers of skipping the initial contact with
the general practitioner must be minimized. The work of
the organized bar in this direction has been sketchy, tentative, halting and ineffective.
In the final chapter, "In the Public Interest", Professor
Cheatham discusses the difficulties arising from the fact
that the public interest is often without a spokesman in
litigation or negotiations between the paid advocates of
competing individuals or groups. It is questionable whether
the problem is really serious. It is doubtful whether the
legal system can provide for "the public interest" a direct
and faithful spokesman in the way it can for a poor or
unpopular defendant; even the government has certain
institutional interests of its own which may bias its view
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of the public interest. The law has managed to provide a
remarkable array of methods designed to prevent the
public interest from being lost in litigation between private parties. These include: the right of the Attorney
General or similar public official to notice and intervention
in litigation raising Constitutional questions'; the class
action and particularly the taxpayers' suit; the amicus
curiae device; permissive intervention of the interested
public groups; the prosecutor's special obligation of fairness; the administrative process; and the development of
the role of the Solicitor General's office as only half a
partisan advocate and half arbiter of the public interest.
The difficulty of providing direct representation of the
public interest is illustrated by the fact that many of the
spokesmen allowed to speak under one or another of the
foregoing devices may speak with conflicting voices in any
particular case.
In passing from the representation of the public interest in litigation to the protection of such interest in negotiations between interested groups, Professor Cheatham
takes a highly controversial position: "The public interest
is deeply involved in what were long thought of as private
matters to be left to private determination"; and as there
should be no taxation without representation, so there
must be "representation of the public interest in the process
by which the two contending powers make their decision
on any important element of the cost of the product to
the public". The discussion, however, is rather far afield
from the pressing practical problems within the direct
responsibility of the organized bar which are dealt with
in the rest of the volume, and somehow seems to strike a
false note, which happily is the only one in the volume.
The recent constitutional amendment adopted in Arizona by a vote of approximately four to one, giving realtors
the right to prepare certain contracts and legal documents
in connection with the sale of real estate, and the increased
lay participation in the institutions of medical practice,
resulting from the inability of the traditional methods of
private medicine to meet the needs for medical services,
should stand as a warning and a challenge to the bar to
take seriously the call of these fine lectures.
MELVIN J.

SYKES*

'28 U.S.C. § 2403; 3 MD. CODE art. 31A, § 11 (1957).
* Member, Maryland Bar; B.A., 1943, Johns Hopkins University; LL.B.,
1948, Harvard University.
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Justice And The Supreme Court. By Rocco J. Tresolini,
J. B. Lippincott Company, Philadelphia: 1963. Pp. 153. $3.50.
This small, readable volume presents, as did two other
volumes of recent vintage (DEATH AND THE SUPREME COURT;'
THE

THim

BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 2 ),

an approach to the

study of Supreme Court decisions that is alien to the formalistic case book approach prevalent in the study of law.
Whereas the traditional casebook focuses on the opinions
of the Court to expose the developmental paths of constitutional decisions and reasoning, these volumes stress the
factual context of the cases to illuminate the writer's particular thesis. These volumes show the reader that there
is much more to a law suit, especially when a constitutional
question is involved, than is apparent from the opinions of
the Court. These volumes are, in a manner of speaking,
merely a new version of a casebook. DEATH AND THE
SUPREME COURT stressed the compassion prevalent when
the Court faces an argument for reversal of a death sen-

tence.

THE

THiRD BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT,

which is

prefaced by an introduction by Professors C. Herman
Pritchett and Alan F. Westin, is a collection of essays by
generally heretofore unpublished authors who treated a
recent significant Court decision by establishing in detail
the factual background of the case and the process by which
arguments for presentation to the Court were developed.
Professor Tresolini's approach expounds libertarian
principles by presenting a synopsis of a single Justice's
life and then presenting his libertarian performance in a
particular case. The jurists selected - Chief Justices Roger
B. Taney, Morrison R. Waite and Charles Evans Hughes,
and Justices John M. Harlan (the first), Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Hugo Black, Wiley B. Rutledge and Frank
Murphy - present an imposing array, but to cast some of
them, especially the Chief Justices selected, in a liberal,
humanitarian mold on the basis of their performance in a
particular case causes pause and illuminates the dangers
inherent in viewing a judge's performance through the constricted vision of a single case, even if we grant that someone has the ability to select the proper case.
The Chapter on Charles Evans Hughes exemplifies the
difficulties inherent in this approach as the attempt is
I Prettyman, DEATHr AND

THE SUPREME COURT (1961).
and Westin, ed., THE THiRD BRLxcH OF GOVERNMENT (1963).
8 Professor Tresolini is Head, Department of Government, Lehigh University.
2Pritchett
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made to dispel any notion that that eminent jurist was a
champion of property rights who lacked concern for
humanitarian values. The vehicle for the Chief Justice's
display of liberalism in his dissent in United States v.
Macintosh,4 which surely is articulate and was eventually
vindicated.5 However, Macintosh involved the denial of
citizenship to a Baptist minister, turned Yale professor,
who refused to declare unconditionally that he would bear
arms in future wars of the United States. Thus, Macintosh
demonstrates no clash between property interests and
liberty and hardly "proved false the many who regarded
[Hughes] as the 'greatest champion of property rights',
with no concern for human rights." The dissent surely displays a concern for human rights but does not dispel any
theory of Hughes' property proclivities which might better
have been tested outside the area of civil liberties and in
the context of the New Deal struggle.
The Chapter on Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite reveals the failing of many biographers - attempting to
"justify" the subject through praise of peripheral and
miniscule matters where the verdict of performance does
not support greatness. One can accept Waite's honesty,
"kindliness", and administrative competence without conferring high judicial competence. The author's struggle to
do that conferring causes this Chapter to clumsily contradict itself. For example, the author writes "[Waite's]
opinions are.., terse, clear and to the point. They furnish
a 'silent rebuke to the rambling treatises to which we are
obliged to listen.' In addition, Waite's opinions, although
sometimes clumsy and opaque, are characterized by common sense, moderation and candor."6 It is not evident to
the reviewer how a man's writing can be at the same time,
on the one hand, clear and terse, and, on the other hand,
clumsy and opaque.
The author's struggle to confer high judicial competence on Waite further leads him to the thought provoking
statement: "[Waite] was satisfied to be a lawyer - a
craftsman who adhered to the 'conventional canons of
judicial review.'" One must ponder whether it is enough
for a judge, especially a Justice on the United States
Supreme Court, and most especially the Chief Justice, to
be merely a lawyer in his approach to his judicial tasks.
Of course, one would expect, in a judge as well as in a
'283 U.S. 605 (1931).
Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
'Tresolini, JUSTICE AND THE SUPREME COURT (1963) 34.
7Ibid.
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lawyer, analytical competence, legal acumen and cultivated intelligence. But the immense role as part of the
nation's final arbiter would appear to demand more of a
Justice, especially a Chief Justice, of the United States
Supreme Court. In addition to possessing a lawyer's talents, one would hope that a jurist would also be a statesman and historian, and possess an ear for the pulse beat of
the nation as well as a sense of humility and humanity.'
Perhaps the most flagrant violation perpetrated by this
volume appears in its closing pages. In denouncing with
typical liberal zest the "military mind" and its impact on
the trial, execution and memory of Japanese General
Yamashita, and in denouncing the opinion and motives of
Chief Justice Harlan Stone in that case, the author perhaps
lost touch with historical truth and with his duty of calm
analysis, for he ventured this comment: "Moreover, the
Supreme Court has never shown great courage in protecting civil liberties during or immediately after a war. ' 9
One must blink at such a patent overstatement. Ex Parte
McCardle'° and Korematsu" support the tone of this indictment, but a number of decisions impinge its veracity. A
roll call of cases, protecting individual liberties in war time
or immediately after, would include West Virginia Board
of Education v. Barnette,2 Ex Parte Milligan,3 and Terminello v. Chicago.4 Perhaps Youngstown Sheet and Tube
Co. v. Sawyer 5 would also qualify, for it surely divested
the Executive of unrestricted war powers. All of these
cases were decided during or immediately after a war.
The grant of excusal from participation in flag salute exercises in Barnette is particularly significant in light of the
author's implied attack on Chief Justice Stone, for it was
sOf course, there is no reason why a lawyer cannot possess these "judicial
traits." Some would, of necessity, need to fit the meold if those elevated
to 'the Bench are to meet the standard. Surely, there are some prominent
attorneys who possess judicial character who never reach the Bench. Yet
this does not make the reviewer believe that a description of a judge as
satisfied to be a lawyer does more than damn him by faint praise.
9Supra, n. 6, 148. (Emphasis added.)
107 Wall. 506 (1869). Note that the statute which constricted the scope
of judicial review in this case was the handiwork of the Reconstruction
Congress which was annoyed at the Court's interference with the subjugation of the conquered rebels.
11Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
12319 U.S. 624 (1943).
134 Wall. 2 (1866).
14337 U.S. 1 (1949).

The author's own first chapter stands in contradiction to this statement, for he there reviews the performance of Chief
Justice Taney in Ex Parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Cas. 9487 (1861). See also
Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
13343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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his stinging dissent in Minersville School District v.
Gobitis8 that foreshadowed Barnette. Stone's many significant contributions to constitutional law and civil liberties
are, of course,
hardly dimmed by this one opinion in
17
Yamashita.
This reviewer has grave doubts about trying to learn
much about a jurist from a single decision. This feature
of the author's approach undermines the merits of this
volume, which are substantial. As a primer for the study
of civil liberties, this volume certainly should stimulate
the reader's interest in this important field of constitutional
law. This volume will appeal, as it apparently was designed to," to laymen and students just whetting their
mental appetites in the marvelous field of constitutional
law. For the lawyer, it will make pleasant reading; it will
not be a source book.

M.
- 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).

17 In

considered in Mason,

ALBERT FIGINSKI*

Stone's life and contributions are

HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW

(1956).

Supra, n. 6, 2-3.
* B.A., 1959, Johns Hopkins University, 1959 (political science) ; LL.B.,
1962, University of Maryland School of Law, 1962; Casenote Editor, Maryland Law Review, 1961-2; Member, Maryland Bar.

